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Introduction
Since their introduction at the beginning of the 1960's 10], fault trees have been widely used for reliability modeling because they allow system designers to describe very concisely how systems fail. Over the last decades, fault tree analysis has helped to dramatically improve the reliability of very complex systems, such as chemical and nuclear plants, aircraft and spacecraft, for which failures can result in very important and unacceptable damages 20] . Fault tree analysis is a two-fold problem. The qualitative aspect of the problem consists of analysing the set of prime implicants of all or part of the fault tree under analysis, that are called minimal cut sets in the particular case where the tree is coherent 13] . The quantitative aspect of the problem consists of evaluating, using the probabilities associated with the basic events of the fault tree, the probability associated with part or all the gates of this tree. Computing the prime implicants of a fault tree with n basic events consists of computing the prime implicants of the Boolean function f denoted by this tree. Since, in the worst case, this function can have O(3 n =n) prime implicants, qualitative fault tree analysis is a problem that is by nature exponential with respect to n 19] . In the same way, since the probability associated with a fault tree depends on the set of elements of f0; 1g n on which f evaluates to 1, computing this probability is also by nature exponential with respect to n. To both aspects of fault tree analysis a lot of e orts has been devoted over the past decades. Though methods have been developed to evaluate the exact probability of a fault tree directly from its structure 17], almost all available analysis tools make an approximation using Poincar e's formula, which consists of summing the probabilities associated with either all or the most relevant prime implicants of the fault tree 10]. This approximation does not change the exponential nature of the problem, and is in most cases not restrictive enough to allow these analysis tools to handle in a satisfying way very complex fault trees. The prime implicant computation problem has also been devoted a lot of e orts since its de nition by Quine in the 1950's 18], because it has applications in many other engineering elds such as digital circuit design 4], automated reasoning 24], and arti cial intelligence 14, 21] . Many prime implicant computation procedures have been developed 2, 4, 16, 24, 25] that, though being all di erent, have comparable computational costs because they all manipulate sets of prime implicants represented in extension. In practice, these procedures are di cult to apply on Boolean functions with more than 20000 prime implicants. Because of this limitation, all currently available fault tree analysis methods use approximations in the prime implicant computation. These approximations consist of computing only the most relevant prime implicants of the fault tree, that are either the ones with the lowest order, or the ones with the largest associated probability. This paper presents a new fault tree analysis method that is dramatically di erent from all previously known methods because it manipulates sets of elements of f0; 1g n and sets of prime implicants in intension. These sets are denoted by Boolean functions, and all the operations that are necessary to perform an exhaustive fault tree analysis are done in intension through these functions instead of being done in extension on the sets themselves. These functions are represented with binary decision diagrams (BDD's) that are a very compact graph representation of Boolean functions 5]. The computational cost of the method presented here is related to the sizes of the BDD's it manipulates, and since there is no relation between the size of a set and the size of the BDD that represents this set 7], this computational cost is completely independent of the number of interpretations of the fault tree and of its number of prime implicants. As a consequence, the method presented here dramatically overcomes the limitations of all previously known methods, because it can treat in seconds fault trees that cannot be analysed by any other technique, for instance non coherent trees with more than 10 20 prime implicants 9]. It handles in an uniform way coherent as well as noncoherent fault trees. It provides system designers with exact qualitative and quantitative informations. This means that all prime implicants of the trees are computed, which is impossible using previously available techniques on complex fault trees, and that the probability associated with these trees is computed without any approximation, while almost all analysis tools only yield an upper bound. Also METAPRIME provides system designers with a very e cient browser that allows them to re ne the qualitative analysis as much as desired. It is between 100 and 1000 times faster than any previously available technique on large fault trees. The paper is divided in 5 parts. Section 2 gives the key characteristics of the binary decision diagram representation. Section 3 explains how sets of products built out of a nite set of Boolean variables can be represented in a canonical way with Boolean functions that we call metaproducts, and gives the expressions that must be evaluated to produce the metaproduct of the set of prime implicants of any Boolean function. Section 4 explains how these concepts are used in the prototype fault tree analysis system METAPRIME. Section 5 gives experimental results obtained with the procedure presented here and discusses them. In the sequel we will note by (x; L; H) the unique vertex of a BDD that has the variable x at its root, and the left and right hand side BDD's L and H respectively. Note that (x; L; H) , (x^L) _ (x^H).
The usual Boolean operators can be evaluated with a quadratic complexity, and the negation in linear time, on BDD's built with the same variable ordering 3, 5] . This polynomial complexity is a remarkable property that makes BDD's very di erent from previously used representations of Boolean functions, for instance the negation has an exponential complexity on the disjunctive normal form 7]. BDD's are very interesting representations of Boolean sets because there is no relation at all between the number of elements in a set and the size of the BDD that represents its characteristic function. Huge Boolean sets can thus potentially be represented with small BDD's 6], and the set operations can be performed with costs that are not related to the numbers of elements of the sets but to the sizes of the BDD's that represent them. Because binary decision diagrams are based on Shannon decomposition, all Shannon decomposition based computation methods that have been developed to reason about Boolean functions, in particular the divide and conquer computation methods traversing, without building them, binary decision trees 22, 23], can be implemented using BDD's. The critical advantage of making such an implementation is that BDD's, because of their canonicity and the sharing of subgraphs, allow identical subproblems to be treated only once.
Prime Implicant Computation
This section presents the metaproduct representation, an original BDD based canonical functional representation of sets of products, that allows us to manipulate these sets with costs related to the sizes of the BDD's that denote them.
De nitions
The set P n of products that can be built from the set of variables fx 1 ; . . .; x n g is the set of formulas fl 1^ ^l n j l k 2 fx k ; x k ; 1g for 1 k ng. A product l 1^ ^l n will be written l 1 l n in the sequel, and the 1's will be omitted. The order of a product is the number of literals occurring in it. The product p of P n is an implicant of f if and only if S p S f , and it is a prime implicant of f if and only if it is an implicant of f and there is no other implicant q of f such that S p S q 19]. For instance, the product x 1 is a prime implicant of the function f(x 1 ; x 2 ) = x 1 , and x 1 x 2 is an implicant of f that is not prime.
MetaProducts
There are 3 n elements in the set P n , so a Boolean space of dimension dn log 2 (3)e is su cient to encode all its elements unambiguously. However, though this dimension is theoretically su cient, it is not the most interesting from the computational point of view. We present here an encoding using 2n variables, thus more than necessary, but whose very strong relations with Shannon decomposition make it easy to implement and e cient the qualitative fault tree analysis procedures.
We rst de ne a many-to-one mapping from the set f0; 1g n f0; 1g n onto the set P n in the following Consider a set of products P and its metaproduct P. This set is the disjoint union of three subsets, one made of the elements of P in which the variable x k does not occur, whose metaproduct is o k^Po k , one made of the elements of P in which the literal x k occurs, whose metaproduct is o k^sk^Po k s k , and one made of the elements of P in which the literal x k occurs, whose metaproduct is o k^sk^Po k s k 8].
The properties given above make many operations on sets of products linear with respect to the size of the BDD of the metaproducts of these sets, if these BDD's are built with the variable ordering 7]: o (1) <
where is a permutation of the integers f1; . . .; ng. In the following we will only consider the case where this permutation equals the one de ning the variable ordering used to build the BDD of the fault tree under treatment. Figure 2 shows the metaproduct of the set of products fx 2 x 4 ; x 1 x 3 x 4 ; x 1 x 2 x 3 x 4 g.
Prime Implicant Computation with Metaproducts
The computation of the metaproduct Prime(f) of the set of prime implicants of the Boolean function f is based on the following theorem, whose proof can be found in 8], that establishes the relation existing between the metaproduct Prime(f) and the metaproducts Prime(f x k ), Prime(f x k ), and Prime(f x k^f x k ).
Theorem 1 Consider a Boolean function f from f0; 1g n into f0; 1g and one of its variables x k . The metaproduct Prime(f) of the set of prime implicants of f is equal to Prime(f) = (o k^P rime(f x k^f x k )) _
This theorem shows that the cost of computing the BDD of the metaproduct Prime(f) from the BDD's of the metaproducts Prime(f x k ), Prime(f x k ), and Prime(f x k^f x k ) is polynomial with respect to the sizes of these BDD's. This theorem also gives the structure of the recursive algorithm that computes this BDD while traversing the BDD of f in a depth rst way. In the worst case the number of vertices that this algorithm has to create and traverse is exponential with respect to the size of the BDD of f because for each vertex (x; L; H) of this BDD the algorithm has to treat the BDD of (L^H) that can contain vertices that are neither in L nor in H. However in the case where the function f is unate, i.e., the fault tree is coherent, the number of recursions that are necessary to compute Prime(f) is exactly equal to the size of the BDD of f, because for each vertex (x; L; H) of this BDD, the BDD (L^H) is either equal to L or H 8].
5 Application to Fault Tree Analysis Figure 3 describes the architecture of the interactive fault tree analysis tool METAPRIME. This tool gives modeling engineers an interactive access, through a command shell, to a comprehensive set of fault tree analysis procedures. After loading a fault tree into memory, the user can select a gate of this tree, compute the BDD of the function associated with this gate, and the metaproduct of its set of prime implicants, and then enter an analysis loop in which the basic step consists of one of the following operations:
Select a subset P of this set of prime implicants using pattern matching.
Compute the number of elements of P .
Compute the distribution of the elements of P w.r.t. their order, their probability, or the occurrence of a given literal. Evaluate the contribution of the elements of P to the probability associated with the current gate. Pretty print the elements of P .
Computing the BDD of a Fault Tree
Building the BDD representing a fault tree can be done through a two step process. The rst step consists of identifying the modules of the tree and of determining the ordering of the propositional variables associated with its basic events 13]. This ordering is produced using a heuristics that has been proposed for multi-level logic networks 15]. The second step consists of traversing the tree in a depth rst way and in computing its associated BDD in a bottom up way. At each gate the BDD's associated with the inputs of the gate are combined using the logical operator of this gate until the selected gate is reached. The decomposition of the tree into modules has a dramatic e ect on the size of the resulting BDD since it has been shown that this size is linear with respect to the sum of the sizes of the BDD's of the di erent modules composing this tree 12].
Qualitative Analysis
The properties of metaproducts make it very easy to compute the number of products that are in the set P denoted by a metaproduct P. The function Size that, when applied on P, returns the number of elements of P is de ned by the following equations:
Size(P) = Size(P o k ) + Size(P o k s k ) + Size(P o k s k ); if P is di erent from 0 and 1:
All elements of P n have an order less or equal to n so the order distribution of the elements of P can be represented by an array of size n+1 whose j{th entry is the number of products of P of order j. The function
OrderDist that, when applied on the metaproduct P, returns the array representing the order distribution of the elements of P , is de ned by the following equations
; if j 1 and P is di erent from 0 and 1 It is obvious to program the recursive functions Size and OrderDist using the equations given in the preceding paragraphs. These functions both use the same recursion scheme that consists of traversing the BDD of P in a depth rst way, and of computing the result in a bottom up way by combining, at each vertex, the results obtained for the left and right sons of this vertex. In order to treat each vertex once during the traversal, the procedures store in each vertex of the BDD the result obtained for this vertex. Note that the recursion scheme de ned above can also be used to compute in time linear with respect to the size of the BDD of P the distribution of the probabilities associated with the elements of P and the distribution of the basic events in these elements. More generally, the de nition of metaproducts and the properties of BDD's allow a large class of operations on sets of products to be performed in times polynomial with respect to the sizes of the BDD's that denote these sets 9]. Selecting the elements of a set P whose order is in a given interval can be done in O(jPj). Selecting the elements of P that contain a given set of literals and do not contain another set of literals can also be done in O(jPj). Once the metaproduct of a subset P of prime implicants has been selected, the exact contribution of P to the probability of the currently selected gate of the fault tree can be computed by rst generating the BDD of the function denoted by the sum of products in P , and then applying the function Pr described below on this BDD.
Quantitative Analysis
The probability Pr(f) associated with a gate of a fault tree is de ned in terms of the probabilities Pr(x 1 ); . . .; Pr(x n ) of its basic events, and the interpretations of the Boolean function f denoted by the part of the fault tree that has this gate as root, in the following way: on the BDD of f, returns the probability associated with this fault tree, is de ned by the equations
if f is di erent from 0 and 1; which show that this probability can be evaluated in O(jfj). In the same way, the conditional and partial probabilities of basic events can be computed in O(jfj) 9].
6 Experimental Results Table 1 gives the characteristics of some real life fault trees treated using METAPRIME. The trees b5000 to bind come from the aircraft industry and the fault trees elf 1 to edf 2 come from the nuclear power industry. For each tree, the table gives the number of basic events of the fault tree (#Basics), its number of gates (#Gates), its number of modules (#Modules), and its number of prime implicants (#Primes). Table 2 gives, for each tree, the size of the BDD of the fault tree (jBDDj), the size of the metaproduct denoting its prime implicants (jMPj), the CPU time (CPU time) in seconds on a Sun SPARC 2 for loading the tree into memory, computing its BDD, its probability, and its prime implicants, and the memory space, in megabytes, needed to perform this computation (Memory). Table 2 . Experimental results on Sun SPARC 2.
All of these trees can be treated by METAPRIME in a few seconds of CPU time and with a small memory, except for the tree edf 2 that requires 6 minutes and 15 megabytes. As far as we know, no available fault tree analysis tool has ever been able to compute all the prime implicants of the fault trees bred to edf 2 and to evaluate their exact associated probabilities. Note that all but one of these trees are made of a very small number of modules, which means that their analysis is not reducible into the analysis of simpler trees. The results clearly demonstrate that jMPj is not related to the numbers of prime implicants of the trees.
For instance jMPj = 39584 for edf 2 that has 20807446 prime implicants. Assuming that the best extensive representation of a product is to use 2 bits per literal, the ratio between the memory spaces needed to represent the prime implicants of this tree in extension and with a metaproduct, respectively, is 2509 (a vertex of a BDD takes 20 bytes). The best ratio is obtained for bind, whose 8:2 10 10 prime implicants are represented by a metaproduct of size 298, which means a ratio greater than 300 millions. 
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